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Abstract. Ethnomethodological studies of work attempt to examine ordinary activities for 
the ways in which they exhibit observably and accountably competent work practice as viewed 
by practitioners. Because it is the analyst's task to describe activities as viewed by practi- 
tioners, qua practitioners, two methodical problems must be solved. The first problem is 
how the analyst can know and describe the members' point of view. Because members dis- 
play their point of view to each other, the problem can be formulated as the question of how 
the analyst can identify members' displays. This is theproblem ofobservability. The second 
problem is how the analyst can make a distinction between activities done by practitioners, 
qua practitioners, and other activities. How can the analyst for instance, distinguish 'talk as 
work' from 'talk at work'? This is theproblem ofspec!ficity. This paper's aim is to critically 
examine the ways in which ethnomethodology manages these two problems. First, the con- 
cept of the 'occasioned corpus of setting features' is discussed. Next, two examples of 
ethnomethodological studies of institutional work are examined. It is argued that hese stud- 
ies fail to provide an adequate description of the specificity of the work studied because both 
disregard practitioners' orientation to the requirements of institutional ccounting and re- 
porting. Finally, it is discussed how practitioners' orientations to institutional criteria can be 
made observable in the analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Harold Garfinkel is fond of citing an exchange between Fred Strodtbeck and 
Edward Shils. Here follows a published version of this story: 
In 1954 Fred Strodtbeck was hired by the University of Chicago Law 
School to analyze tape recordings of jury deliberations obtained from a 
bugged jury room. Edward Shils was on the committee that hired him. 
When Strodtbeck proposed to a law school faculty to administer Bales 
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Interaction ProcessAnalysis categories, Shils complained: "By using Bales 
Interaction Process Analysis I'm sure we'll learn what about a jury's de- 
liberations makes them a small group. But we want to know what about 
their deliberations makes them a jury" (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 
1981: 133). 
Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston state that he social sciences are unrespon- 
sive to this complaint and that echnical methods for turning it into an agenda 
of researchable phenomena are not available to them. The literature on work 
in institutional settings does not provide descriptions ofwhat work practice 
in these settings consists of and how practitioners manage the tasks they are 
confronted with. Thus, according to Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, the 
social sciences do not provide an answer to such questions as "How is an 
accountably adequate surgical incision produced and recognised?" and "How 
is the utterance of a juror the recognizably judicious outcome of'talking in a 
juror's fashion'?" 
One result of this gap is that "occupational practitioners frequently fail to 
recognize themselves or their daily concerns in social scientific accounts 
and for this reason they find the latter to be uninteresting, misleading or plain 
exasperating" (Heritage, 1984: 299). Ethnomethodological studies of work, 
in contrast, attempt to examine ordinary activities for the ways in which they 
exhibit observably and accountably competent work practice as viewed by 
practitioners (Heritage, 1984: 302). This approach implies a "unique preoc- 
cupation with local production and the worldly observability of reasoning" 
(Lynch, Livingston and Garfinkel, 1983: 206). 
Because it is the analyst's task to describe activities as viewed by practi- 
tioners, qua practitioners, two methodical problems must be solved. The 
first problem is how the analyst can know and describe members' point of 
view. Because members display their point of view to each other, the prob- 
lem can be formulated as the question of how the analyst can identify mem- 
bers' displays. This is the problem of observability. The second problem is 
how the analyst can make a distinction between activities done by practition- 
ers, qua practitioners, and other activities. How can the analyst, for instance, 
distinguish 'talk as work' from 'talk at work' (Zimmerman, 1992: 41-42)? 
This is the problem of specificity. 
This paper's aim is to critically examine the ways in which ethno- 
methodology manages these two problems. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. First, I discuss the concept of the 'occasioned corpus of setting fea- 
tures' (Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970), which provides the frame for the 
subsequent examination ofthe problems of observability and of specificity 
that are the topic of this paper. Subsequently, I discuss two examples of 
ethnomethodological studies of institutional work, namely Garfinkel, Lynch 
and Livingston's study of the astronomical work of discovering an optical 
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pulsar (1981) and Zimmerman's study of how 'context' is achieved in 911 
emergency alls (1992). I argue that hese studies fail to provide an adequate 
description of the specificity of the work studied because both disregard prac- 
titioners' orientation to the requirements of institutional ccounting and re- 
porting. Finally I discuss that, and how, practitioners' orientations to 
institutional criteria can be made observable inthe analysis. 
2. The occasioned corpus of setting features 
Ethnomethodology's approach to the problem of 'institutional context' is 
clearly formulated by Zimmerman and Pollner in their paper "The everyday 
world as a phenomenon" (1970), in which they coined the concept of the 
'occasioned corpus of setting features'. This concept captures the notion that 
the features of a setting are not 'given' but rather are achieved by partici- 
pants who 'assemble' the corpus: "[E]ach social setting and every one of its 
recognized features i construed as the accomplishment of he situated work 
of displaying and detecting those features at the time they are made visible" 
(1970: 94). Garfinkel, who had used the concept 'corpus of knowledge' in 
his study of jurors' decision making (1967: 107), had borrowed it from 
Kaufmann (1944) who, discussing the methodology ofthe social sciences, 
had pointed out that science knows only that which it has admitted to the 
body of its findings (its 'corpus of knowledge') by the appropriate proce- 
dures, i.e., independent from common sense. 
In Garfinkel's reading, the upshot of Kaufmann's viewpoint was that, since 
sociology had no established and agreed standards for including knowledge 
within its corpus, the sociological theorist, qua theorist, knows nothing. Hence 
he concluded that sociologists must possess their knowledge by something 
other than conformity to the rules of scientific inquiry. In other words, they 
depend on what is common sense and obvious (cf. Sharrock and Anderson, 
1986: 44). According to Garfinkel, this conclusion does not only apply to 
sociological knowledge. Inhis study of jurors' decision making, for instance, 
Garfinkel inferred from interviews with jurors that hey decide 'the facts' of 
a case, which may be used as the basis for further inferences, not by applying 
forms of scientific reasoning but rather by consulting the consistency ofal- 
ternative claims with common sense models. According to Garfinkel, 
[T]he sorting of claims between the statuses of correct and incorrect 
grounds of inference produces a set of accepted points of fact and ac- 
cepted schemes for relating these points. The sorting produces a 'corpus 
of knowledge' [...] This 'corpus' is treated by the jurors at any given 
time as 'the case'. [...] The 'corpus' permits [the jurors] to infer the le- 
gitimacy of their expectation that hey will be socially supported for their 
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choice of verdict (Garfinkel, 1967:106-107). 
Garfinkel emphasises that jurors apply neither amethod of scientific inquiry 
(1967:108) nor other types of formal or official procedures of deciding (1967: 
114). He claims that, instead, jurors' decisions which sort fact from fancy 
do not differ substantially from the decisions [a juror] makes in his ordi- 
nary affairs. Nevertheless, there is a difference. The difference bears on 
the work of assembling the 'corpus' which serves as grounds for inferring 
the correctness of a verdict (Garfinkel, 1967:110). 
Thus what makes a jury a jury (rather than a small group) is, according to 
Garfinkel, the "work of assembling the 'corpus' which serves as grounds for 
inferring the correctness of a verdict". It is doubtful whether Shils would be 
satisfied by this finding, since it does not specify the criteria that are used in 
inferring the correctness of a verdict. But Garfinkel gives good reasons for 
not providing such a specification. An appreciation of these reasons is cru- 
cial for the understanding of ethnomethodology's approach to the 'institu- 
tional context'. 
Garfinkel notes that it is easy to find rules for assessing a jury's compe- 
tence. He lists ten of such rules, but emphasises that, although jurors talk 
about them, there is no indication that jurors use them in actual decision 
making. Instead, the official rules are used for retrospectively finding that 
the outcome of their deliberations i a competent decision: 
[P]ersons, in the course of a career of  actions, discover the nature of the 
situations in which they are acting, and [...] the actor's own actions are 
first order determinants of the sense that situations have, in which, liter- 
ally speaking, actors f ind themselves (Garfinkel, 1967:115; emphasis in 
the original) 
The notion of actors 'finding' themselves in situations of which the sense is 
determined in the course of their actions is also prominent in Garfinkel and 
Sacks' paper "On formal structures of practical actions" (1970), in particular 
in their discussion of 'Richards' gloss'. According to Garfinkel and Sacks, 
I.A. Richards (1955) suggested 
the use of question marks to bracket some spoken phrase or text. For ex- 
ample, ?empirical social research?, theoretical systems?, systems of se- 
quences?, ?social psychological variables?, ?glossing practices? instruct 
a reader to proceed as follows. How a bracketed phrase is to be compre- 
hended is at the outset specifically undecided. How it is to be compre- 
hended is the task of a reading whereby some unknown procedure will be 
used to make the text comprehensible. Since nothing about the text or 
procedure needs to be decided for a while, we will wait for the while, for 
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whatever the while. When and if we have read and talked about he text, 
we will review what might be made of it. Thus we can have used the text 
not as undefined terms but as a gloss over a lively context whose ways, as 
a sense assembly procedure, we found no need to specify. (Note: we mean 
that none was called for, and that in other glossing practices omething 
else could be the case.) (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 343). 
In the quoted fragment, Garfinkel and Sacks describe the work of making 
sense of a text as a 'glossing practice' of which the outcome is contingent on 
the specific course the activity of glossing will happen to follow. This out- 
come is dependent on a specific 'context' which is not known at the outset 
but comes into being in the course of the glossing work. In other words, 
'discovering' a sense within a 'context' is a form of documentary interpreta- 
tion, i.e., it is a reflexive practice: 
Richards' gloss consists of practices of talking with use of particular texts 
in a fashion such that how their comprehended character will have worked 
out in the end remains unstated throughout, although the course of talk 
may be so directed as to compose a context which embeds the text and 
thereby provides the text's replicas with noticed, changing, but unremarked 
functional characters such as 'a text in the beginning,' 'a text as an end 
result,' 'an intervening flow of conversation to link the two,' and so on 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 343). 
This is a gloss of how members make sense of texts (and of talk and behavior, 
for that matter). But what does this imply for the question of how the 
analyst should read that same text, talk or behavior? Two answers are 
possible: 
1. If we take it as the analyst's task to determine the 'sociological' meaning 
of the text, he or she must gloss the text in a specific, recognizably socio- 
logical way, i.e., he or she must 'compose a context which embeds the 
text' sociologically. The sociologist's gloss will be different from mem- 
bers' glosses. 
2. If it is the analyst's task to describe the sense that the text has for mem- 
bers, he or she must describe how the text is glossed by members in a 
particular event, i.e., he or she must discover and describe the 'context' 
that was composed by members in their glossing work. 
The first mentioned task, determining the 'sociological' meaning of a text 
(or behavior), is the one that sociology traditionally sets for itself. This is, 
however, problematic for ethnomethodology, precisely because 'sociologi- 
cal' glosses differ from, and are independent of, members' glosses. It is the 
description of the sense that texts and behaviors have for members that 
ethnomethodological studies of work explicitly take as their task. The ques- 
tion which 'context' is allowed to enter the analysis must, therefore, be an- 
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swered by referring the question to members: they decide in their practices 
what counts as 'appropriate' context. Hence it is the analyst's task to 
examine asetting and its features as temporally situated accomplishments 
of parties to the setting. [...] For the member the corpus of setting fea- 
tures presents itself as a product, as objective and independent scenic fea- 
tures. For the analyst he corpus is the family of practices employed by 
members to assemble, recognise, and realize the corpus-as-a-product. 
Accordingly, from the point of view of the analyst, the features of the 
setting as they are known and attended to by members are unique to the 
particular setting in which they are made observable. Any feature of a 
setting - its perceived regularity, purposiveness, typicality- is conceived 
as the accomplishment of the work done in and on the occasion of that 
feature's recognition. The practices through which a feature is displayed 
and detected, however, are assumed to display invariant properties across 
settings whose substantive f atures they make observable. It is to the dis- 
covery of these practices and their invariant properties that inquiry is to 
be addressed (Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970: 95). 
The implications of this approach are many, of which several are discussed 
by Zimmerman and Pollner (1970: 95-102). First, the occasioned corpus 
does not consist of a stable collection of elements, Such elements may en- 
compass the biographies of the setting's personnel, its norms, its history, and 
so on. But whether such features are to be included in the analysis depends 
on what members do or did on the particular occasion that is studied. 
Second, for members, the work of assembling an occasioned corpus con- 
sists in the ongoing 'corpusing' and 'decorpusing' of elements. The avail- 
ability of a particular element isconceived to be the consequence of a course 
of work through which it is displayed and detected. The analyst must de- 
scribe members' composing of context(s) as an ongoing process without a 
fixed end-point. The analyst does not have recourse to such explanatory de- 
vices as a shared complex of roles, motives, norms, values, and the like, 
standing independent of and prior to a given occasion: "No setting is con- 
ceived as a product. Each setting and every one of its features consists of the 
way in which the setting and its features are displayed and detected" 
(Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970: 97). 
Third, the elements organized by the occasioned corpus are unique to the 
particular setting in which it is assembled, and hence ungeneralizable to other 
settings. This implies that the analyst cannot study how the recognisable 
accountability of, e.g., 'psychiatric nterviews' in general is accomplished. 
The analyst can, instead, only describe how a specific setting is made ac- 
countable as an instance of a 'psychiatric nterview'. (This does, however, 
not exclude the possibility of studying members' work of constructing 
typologies of classes of social settings.) 
Fourth, features of everyday social settings are 'reduced' to a family of 
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practices and their properties. The occasioned corpus is conceived to consist 
in members' methods of exhibiting the connectedness, orderliness, and rel- 
evance of the features of any particular setting as features in, of, and linked 
with a more encompassing, ongoing setting, typically referred to as 'the so- 
ciety'. The features of that society are, from this perspective, to be found 
nowhere lse, and in no other way, than in and upon those occasions of 
members' work, lay and professional, through which those features are 
made available. 
The ethnomethodological approach, thus, consists of two distinct, though 
related, steps. The first step is the definition of 'context' or 'setting' as some- 
thing essentially contingent on its display by members participating in the 
setting, and therefore uniquely bound to a specific occasion. In contrast, 
the practices by which features of a setting are displayed, are considered 
invariant and hence not bound to specific occasions. The second step is 
taking the invariant features, i.e., the practices of displaying 'order', as the 
main object of inquiry. This short introduction to the concept of the 'occa- 
sioned corpus of setting features' clarifies why the results of Garfinkel's 
study of jurors' deliberations did not consist of a list of substantive f a- 
tures that make them recognizable asa jury's work. According to Garfinkel, 
it is the occasioned jurors' work of displaying its deliberations a such that 
make them a jury. 
The above discussion of Zimmerman and Pollner's concept of the 'occa- 
sioned corpus of setting features' can only provide the frame for the exami- 
nation of the problems that are the topic of this paper, namely, the problems 
of observability and of specificity. However, these problems can now be 
formulated in a more precise way, as follows: 
1. Observability: How can the analyst identify the elements of the corpus? 
2. Specificity: How can the analyst distinguish between the elements that 
are observably oriented to practitioners' work and other elements? 
3. The work of discovering an optical pulsar 
In their study of the discovery of a pulsar, Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston 
(1981) explain why the sociological pproach to the study of work in organi- 
sational settings gives a distorted picture of that work. The work of discover- 
ing a pulsar would in such an approach be depicted as the mere application 
of a generally accepted way of astronomical reasoning. This would, how- 
ever, be a misleading depiction, because it is obvious that 
their collection, when it is examined in the light of the first time through, 
was obtained, and was only obtainable, case-after-case, as an historicized 
series. The series was done as a lived orderliness, in real time. Only as a 
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feature of its local historicity did the series project as its possibility that it 
could become an atemporalized collection of measurable properties of 
pulse frequency and star location that according to a Galilean science are 
independent of the local practices as of which just this gathering of obser- 
vations was composed (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981: 135). 
The authors emphasise that these activities could only postfactum be de- 
scribed as merely the competent registration offeatures of an object hat was 
only waiting out there to be discovered. In contrast to what the published 
article suggests and to what sociologists of science would expect, the work 
of discovery did not consist of "documenting theoretic provisions for the 
optical pulsar" (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981:136), but rather was 
similar to the way a potter forms an observable cultural object: "[T]he pulse 
takes 'shape' in and as the way it is worked, and from a place-to-start with to 
an increasingly definite thing" (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981: 137). 
Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston's approach implies that they, in their own 
words, do not examine 
the end-point object for its correspondence to an original plan. We want o 
disregard, we want not to take seriously, how closely or how badly the 
object corresponds tosome original design - particularly to some cogni- 
tive expectancy orto some theoretical model-that is independent of their 
embodied work's particular occasions as of which the object's production 
- the object- consists, only and entirely (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 
1981: 137). 
But, if the astronomers' discovery of an optical pulsar is seen as the product 
of embodied work's particular occasions which cannot be described as the 
enactment of an original design, how then must their work be described? 
According to Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, there is no descriptive solu- 
tion: 
[These practices] are unavailable to reasoned reflection, to introspection, 
to ethnographic reportage, tothe analysis of ethnographic documentation, 
or to documented argument except, and at best, as documented conjec- 
tures (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981: 140). 
Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston's article does not provide any description 
of their data (consisting of transcripts of talk, reprints of logs, and the pub- 
lished article) which, however, are presented separately in appendices. By 
merely referring to this data in general terms, without any discussion of spe- 
cific fragments, the article (10 printed pages) functions rather as an intro- 
duction, or preface, to this data (16 printed pages) than as a description or 
analysis. The article presents itself as nothing but an elaborate warning against 
using the data for a 'constructive' description of competent astronomical 
117 
work. Although Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston repeatedly claim that the 
outcome of this night's work in the observatory (e.g., the pulse frequencies 
as reported in the astronomical rticle) was accountably competent astrono- 
mers' work, they do not point in their data to any feature of this work that, as 
an element of the occasioned corpus, could count as a document of its ac- 
countability as astronomers' work. 
The night's work's in the observatory was done in order to discover an 
optic pulsar and its result was the astronomically acknowledged discovery 
of just such a thing. Even if we grant Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston the 
point that this does not necessarily imply that the actual night's work con- 
sisted of the mere enactment of a design, the question remains what made 
their activities effectively produce the desired outcome, the discovery of a 
pulsar. Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston give a partial answer to this ques- 
tion by presenting in an appendix (Appendix 5; pp. 154-158) transcripts of 
talk that document how in the course of the night's work in the observatory 
the 'potter's object' took shape, i.e, the way how it developed from an 'evi- 
dently-vague IT' into a discovered optical pulsar (1984: 135). This data docu- 
ments indeed that it is only 'as a feature of its local historicity' that he series 
of Runs ~ did project as its possibility that it could become a collection of 
measurable properties of pulse frequency and star location. 
However, by emphasising sostrongly the possibility that this series could 
become acollection of measurable properties of pulse frequency, Garfinkel, 
Lynch and Livingston eglect the fact that it actually became such a collec- 
tion. Their account does not provide any analysis of this striking feature of 
the night's work. The 'projection of a possibility' is, of course, not a suffi- 
cient explanation for its becoming true. Projected possibilities must be real- 
ized in the form of, e.g., specific diagrams that display very specific outcomes 
of manipulations of instruments. Although Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston 
(1981: 142) acknowledge that "[b]oth, practical action and practical reason- 
ing, are chained to the certain, technical, materially specific appearances of 
astronomy's things", they do not describe this work of chaining in any de- 
tail, and one finds in their article only in passing a specification of what 
makes certain things count as 'astronomy's things'. 
Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston present the transcripts in Appendix 5 as 
data that documents he historicity of the astronomers' observations. Apart 
from the work's historicity, however, this data reveals also how the artful- 
ness of that work consists of performing it in such a way that both its result 
(the discovery of a pulsar with particular documented characteristics) and 
the activities that produced it can be reported. What, in other words, is ne- 
glected by Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston is that the astronomers do not 
only perform their work in an accountably astronomical way, but that they 
produce its account at the same time. In collecting technical data, in their 
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talk, and in their notes, they are already assembling the text of the article. 
They are not only, or primarily, 'projecting' the possibility that their work 
could be reported as a collection of measurable properties of pulse frequency, 
but they are already making that very report. 
The data shows also that the astronomers' 'finishing off' of the discovery 
of the pulsar is not similar to the way in which jurors, according to Garfinkel, 
retrospectively find that the outcome of their deliberations was a competent 
decision. It is, in contrast, the astronomers' prospective orientation to what 
counts as a competent astronomical report that enables them to conclude 
retrospectively that they 'actually' have discovered a pulsar. Astronomical 
work is contingent, local and embodied, but it is not common-sensical in the 
way jurors' sorting of fact from fancy is. Like a 'potter's object', an astro- 
nomical discovery is not found but produced. But, unlike a 'potter's object', 
this discovery is self-reflexive in that (an account of) the way it is produced 
forms a necessary part of it. 2 
By taking it as 'obvious' that the astronomers are preoccupied with an 
astronomically accountable collection of observations, Garfinkel, Lynch and 
Livingston do not address the questions of observability (the question of 
how they can identify and describe the participants' point of view) and 
specificity (the question how they can identify and describe an astronomi- 
cally oriented preoccupation). It can only be inferred from their account of 
this 'obviousness', what kind of observables count for them as observable 
displays of an orientation to the rules of astronomically valid observations: 
[E]ach observation is announced at the outset as one in a numerical series 
of successive observations, ettings on the instruments are recorded, and 
mention is made of how the observations will be a repeat of or a check on 
previous observations. The mathematical collection is obvious too in their 
article where they display their first chart recorded case of a pulse as an 
icon for the class of pulse it names (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 
1981: 135). 
It is interesting to note that Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston do not only 
identify the announcement of observations, and the mentioning of how ob- 
servations will be a repeat of or a check on previous observations, as docu- 
ments of an orientation to the general and formal procedures of astronomy, 
but also the way in which the pulse is displayed by the astronomers in the 
article. However, it is not clear whether they consider this only as a feature 
of the article (as a feature of how the work is presented) or as a feature of the 
work itself. 
In summary, on the one hand, Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston demon- 
strate clearly ethnomethodology's argument that work can only be studied 
adequately by acknowledging its contingencies and historicity. But, on the 
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other hand, they disregard a very important feature of that work, namely, that 
the discovery of an optical pulsar (as viewed by the practitioners) does not 
only consist of the work of observing its features (pulse frequency, etc.) but 
of its competent reporting as well. The result is at best a partial description of 
how the work in the observatory is done, in which its observable orientation 
to the wider context of the discipline of astronomy, a specitic interweaving 
of doing observations and reporting about them, is downplayed. In the fol- 
lowing section I discuss a similar problem in a conversation analytic study 
of 911 emergency calls. 
4. Zimmerman's study of the achievement of 'context' 
In his article "Achieving context" (1992), Zimmerman examines 
the notion that the achievement of an entry into an encounter mutually 
understood tobe 'institutional' is a situated, turn-by-turn accomplishment 
of participants focusing general interactional skills and specific knowl- 
edge on issues posed by the exigencies of the call as an interaction and a 
service encounter (Zimmerman, 1992: 37). 
How is, according to Zimmerman, this entry 'achieved', and how can the 
analyst identify participants' 'specific knowledge'? 3 Zimmerman begins his 
discussion with stating that in any call the caller is accountable for calling 
and that this accountability has a particular salience in emergency calls. He 
illustrates this with the two following, rather exceptional, calls (Zirnmerman, 
1992: 38; cf. Whalen and Zimmerman, 1987: 179): 
Extract 1 
D = dispatcher; C = caller. 
01 D: 
02 
03 
04 C: 
05 D: 
07 C: 
County Emergency 
((Caller hangs up)) 
((Phone being dialled and ringing)) 
Hello? 
Yes, this is nine one one emergency alling back, do you have an 
emergency? 
No we don't 
Extract 2 
01 D: 
02 
03 
04 
05 D: 
Nine one emergency 
((Loud voices in the background - 
screaming and arguing)) 
((Click)) 
Oo:::ps! Sounds like a domestic 
120 
06 
07 
08 
09 
D: 
((Dispatcher calls phone number from which call 
originated)) 
This is thuh Sheriff's Department. 
Is there a problem? 
After having provided the background information that in this 911 dispatch 
center the telephone number of callers dialling the 911 number appears on a 
computer screen, permitting the dispatcher to recontact a caller or to dis- 
patch assistance if warranted, Zimmerman notes that its utilisation displays 
the dispatchers' presumption that emergency assistance is the purpose of 
the call until determined to be otherwise. In extract 1 the callback 
'disconfirms' the assumption of need. Background sounds erve to frame 
extract 2 as a request for assistance in a domestic dispute, which the dis- 
patcher seeks to confirm in the callback (Zimmerman, 1992: 39). 
Thus, questions uch as "Do you have an emergency?" and "Is there a prob- 
lem?" observably display, according to Zimmerman, the dispatchers' pre- 
sumption that emergency assistance is the purpose of the call until determined, 
by the dispatcher, to be otherwise. Zimmerman's general comment on this 
kind of data is: 
The fundamental 'institutional' connection between a server and a client, 
generically, and, in this case, emergency dispatching organizations and 
the public (i.e., citizen complainants, victims, and so on) is found in the 
initiation and completion of the telephone connection between caller and 
answerer (Zimmerman, 1992: 40). 
It is a general feature of any call that callers identify themselves in the begin- 
ning and that callers account for the purpose of the call. These general proce- 
dures are applied in these particular calls as a device for the 'achievement' 
of the 'institutional identities' that the callers will have in these calls. In 911 
emergency alls, dispatchers and callers present themselves a particular 'iden- 
tities' with particular purposes which are made available to each other as 
features of specific situations called 'emergencies'. 
Zimmerman's approach is characterised bythe application of a methodi- 
cal restriction consisting of the strict avoidance of any inference of'context' 
that is not made observable by the participants. This does not imply that the 
analyst must or can abstain from using her or his knowledge of the 'context' 
he or she is studying. Its use, however, is restricted to only those instances 
where participants observably display an orientation to it. Similar to the par- 
ticipants, who must know the features of a 'context' such as an 'emergency 
call' for being able to display them in their talk, the analyst must know the 
features as well in order to be able to identify them. The analyst must pro- 
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vide the underlying pattern (i.e., the 'context' and its features) in order to 
describe an utterance as its display (document). 
Thus, the ethnomethodological and the 'constructive' approach to 'con- 
text' do not differ in the kind of knowledge they bring to bear on the analy- 
sis. Both cannot but apply the knowledge that analysts as members have of 
the more or less abstract and generalised features of societal institutions. But 
there is a difference in how this knowledge isused. The 'constructive' analy- 
sis of institutional encounters usually will rely on the unrestricted use of that 
knowledge in order to explain the observed events. An ethnomethodological 
analysis, in contrast restricts its use to those elements of this knowledge that 
are necessary for elucidating them. This can be illustrated with the following 
example (Zimmerman, 1992: 40): 
Extract 3 
01 D: 
02 
03 C: 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 D: 
09 
10 C: 
I1 D: 
12 C: 
13 D: 
Nine one one emer:gency 
(0.6) 
Yes, I need a towing tru:ck for one car away 
( ) they di:d park in my parking spa:ce the 
who:ie day and overnight (0.6) 'n they won't 
mo:ve. 
(0.5) 
I'm I'm sarry? 
(1.2) 
Okay, I need a towing truck (0.6) for towing. 
You need a TOW TRUCK? 
Yes. 
Then call a tow company. 
According to Zimmerman, this call demonstrates that and how a receiver 
displays an interest in determining whether callers seek the kind of service 
that his organisation provides. The assumption is that anyone (i.e., partici- 
pants and analysts) will see that the receiver's advice to call a tow company 
is not the service requested by caller (although the caller does express his 
needing a towing truck and does not explicitly mention what he expects the 
receiver to do) and that caller's request is not an emergency. This presup- 
poses that we all know what an emergency is (not a car in a private parking 
space) and what 911 dispatch centers are supposed to be called for (for dis- 
patching emergency assistance, not for giving advice about whom to call 
when another kind of service is needed), i.e., that we share a detailed knowl- 
edge of the 'context' hat is involved here. 
Taking 'displaying and orienting to context in talk' as the topic of analysis 
does not imply a specific stance on whether or not, and how, talk in institu- 
tions is 'influenced' by the institutional context. It does simply not address 
the latter question. It is clear that Zimmerman's analysis of 911 calls would 
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have yielded very different results if the question had not been restricted to 
participants' mutual understanding of the encounter as 'institutional', but 
had been oriented to the question how dispatchers manage calls as part of 
their work as a whole, which consists of a variety of other tasks, such as 
producing records of calls and dispatching messages toothers in the organi- 
sation. Such a question is an ethnomethodological onein is own right. How- 
ever, the topic of analysis would not be restricted to receivers' display of 
'context' to callers, and vice versa, but include receivers' display of 'con- 
text' to colleagues and supervisors as well. 
Zimmerman consistently confines the analysis to what happens between 
caller and receiver. Apparently he is not interested inhow receivers organize 
their other tasks, such as sending dispatches to patrol units, or in how they 
comply with formal obligations, uch as writing 'complete' records and call- 
ing back callers who have not given a reportable reason for their call. The 
'success' of a call, as viewed by receivers, is arguably dependent on the 
degree to which the call's course facilitates the competent completion of 
these other tasks. Receivers' questions in callbacks, such as "Is there a prob- 
lem?" and "Do you have an emergency?", therefore, do not necessarily (or 
only) display the dispatchers' presumption that emergency assistance is the 
purpose of the call until determined tobe otherwise (although it will likely 
be heard this way by the caller). At the same time, or primarily, it can be a 
display of an orientation to established rules of operation, and be heard as 
such by colleagues and supervisors. 
Similarly to Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston who explicitly disregard 
practitioners' observable orientation to the extra-local context of astronomy 
as a writing science, Zimmerman disregards receivers' orientation to a con- 
text that, although it is not observable for the caller, is nevertheless acutely 
and immediately present for the receiver. In both examples of the 
ethnomethodological study of work, the 'occasioned corpus of setting fea- 
tures' is arbitrarily confined to elements hat display considerations that are 
relevant for the immediate tasks at hand such as, respectively, doing meas- 
urements that count as astronomical observations and telephone conversa- 
tions that can count as competent 911 calls. Both studies dismiss as elements 
of the corpus orientations toconcerns (such as the writing of an astronomical 
article and the completion of an institutionally required record of a 911 call) 
that, though not visible in their data, are no less immediately relevant in the 
course of the work studied. 
The restriction of the analysis to only those elements of the 'corpus' that 
are made observable in the call (or conversation for that matter), provides 
the analyst a double handicap. On the one hand the analyst restricts the de- 
scription of the work of one party to only those elements that are made ob- 
servable to the other party, which results in the analyst knowing in principle 
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as much of the first party as the second oes. But, on the other hand, he or 
she restricts the description of the work of the second party to only those 
elements that are made observable to the first, which results in the analyst 
knowing much less than each of the parties. What is deliberately ost is a 
sensitivity to power differences, 'hidden agendas', and other forms of in- 
equality that are characteristic phenomena of institutional encounters. 
Summarizing, Zimmerman's article provides a solution to both problems 
that are the topic of this article, the problems ofobservability and of specificity. 
The solution to the problem of observability consists of a double act of iden- 
tification. By identifying with one party, the analyst is supposed to be able to 
'see' what is made observable by the other party, and by identifying with the 
latter he is supposed to be able to 'see' what is made observable by the first 
party. Apart from the analyst's competence as a member, no other competences 
are needed. The problem of specificity is solved in the same vein, by assum- 
ing that the parties in the situation studied share a stock of knowledge with 
each other (and with the analyst) that enables them to recognise 'contextual' 
elements as such. These solutions provide for the identification and descrip- 
tion of'mutually understood context' indeed, i.e., of receivers' work as viewed 
by callers. They do not provide for the description of receivers' work as 
viewed by receivers. 4 
The technical distance between receivers and callers in 911 emergency 
calls prevents callers from getting a complete picture of the receivers' ac- 
tivities during the call (among them the writing of a report of the call on a 
visual display screen). For Zimmerman and other conversation analysts 
(Schegloff and Jefferson among others), it was precisely this invisibility of 
each others' (other) activities that made telephone calls privileged sites for 
studying the achievement of 'context' in utterances only. In conversations, 
however, it is possible as well that an orientation to a specific 'context' is 
observably displayed by one party whereas, at the same time, it is not ob- 
servable for the other party. In the next sections I will discuss instances of 
such occasions. 
5. Hidden agendas 
Because veryday conversations are characterised bythe lack of any prede- 
termined 'context', it is the participants' task to make observable for each 
other the specific 'identities' (such as, for instance, 'father' and 'daughter', 
'husband and wife', 'just friends', etc.) that they consider relevant for that 
particular occasion. This is what ethnomethodology refers to with the ex- 
pression 'mutually understood context'. Let us look at Extract 4 with this in 
mind. 
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Extract 4 
01 " S :  
02 E: 
O3 
04 S: 
05 
06 E: 
07 
08 S: 
O9 
10 E: 
11 S: 
12 E: 
13 S: 
Hi, Ray. How is your girl friend feeling? 
What do you mean, how is she feeling? 
Do you mean physical or mental? 
I mean how is she feeling? 
What's the matter with you? 
Nothing. 
Just explain a little clearer what do you mean? 
Skip it. 
How are your Med School applications coming? 
What do you mean, 'How are they?' 
You know what I mean. 
I really don't. 
What's the matter with you? Are you sick? 
This is an interesting conversation, particularly for analysts who, in the 
ethnomethodological tr dition, are interested in how members display mu- 
tual understanding (or its absence). The transcript shows how E displays his 
lack of understanding of S's questions, how S displays his lack of under- 
standing of E's lack of understanding and, finally, how S is orientated to a 
possible explanation for E's behavior ("Are you sick?"). The extract shows 
that mutual understanding cannot be taken for granted and that conversa- 
tionalists, in some cases, must do a lot of work in order to 'achieve' it. The 
extract could also be the starting point for a study of categories such as 'sick' 
that are used for explaining an apparently unexpected lack of understanding. 
Readers who have already recognised this extract as an excerpt of an 
account by one of Garfinkel's tudents, as presented by Garfinkel in his "Stud- 
ies of the routine grounds of everyday activities" (1967: 42-43), will imme- 
diately see that such an approach to this data fails to discover an important 
'fact', namely, that E's utterances actually are not a display of a lack of 
understanding of what S says but, instead, a display of an orientation to 
Garfinkel's instruction 
to engage an acquaintance or a friend in an ordinary conversation and, 
without indicating that what the experimenter [i]s asking [i]s in any way 
unusual, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his commonplace 
remarks (Garfinkel, 1967: 42). 
In Zimmerman's approach, an analyst cannot include Garfinkel's instruc- 
tions in the 'occasioned corpus' as long as E has not made observable to S 
that this occasion is not an 'everyday' conversation for him but, instead, a
sociological experiment. Such an observable display is, of course, absent 
here because the nature of the experiment is precisely that it is not clear for S 
that he is its 'victim'. 
Thus, the application of Zimmerman's approach to this data would result 
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in a misrepresentation of what the conversation was all about, at least in the 
eyes of one participant. The analysis would result in a more or less adequate 
description of S's utterances but would misrepresent E's utterances. The ana- 
lyst would identify with S and, like him, be cheated. Although it is clear that 
this approach would not enable the analyst o describe E's hidden agenda, it 
does not follow immediately that there is something seriously and inherently 
wrong with it. One can, for instance, question whether it is reasonable to 
expect from a specific type of analysis that it is immune to lying. It can even 
be argued that it is an intended outcome of Zimmerman's methodological 
prescriptions that analysts are as vulnerable to being cheated as members 
are. If it is the analyst's objective to describe what is mutually available to 
participants in the situation (and nothing more), it is sufficient o restrict he 
analysis to what E observably displays to S (and vice versa). This implies 
that, even if Garfinkel's instructions are known, this knowledge should not 
be used. 
Such, and other related, arguments could be taken as occasions for theo- 
retical explorations of  the principles of conversation analysis and of 
ethnomethodology. I would prefer, however, to take a more pragmatic stance. 
We could, for instance, examine the practical question on what conditions 
E's orientation to Garfinkel's instructions, though not observable for S, could 
be considered, even within the frame of ethnomethodology, as observable 
for the analyst. It is clearly not a sufficient condition that Garfinkel has given 
these instructions to E. But let us imagine another, more complicated, case. 
Suppose, for instance, that S leaves E at the end of Extract 4 and that Garfinkel, 
who was observing the conversation, ow addresses E as follows: 
Extract 4b 
14 G: 
15 E: 
Well done, Ray. 
Yeah. I was nervous, but it was OK. 
I assume that Garfinkel's and E's remarks would make a lot of a difference 
for ethnomethodologists who would analyze this conversation i accordance 
with Zimmerman's prescriptions, although it would not make a difference 
for S (if he had just left the scene). This exchange between Garfinkel and E 
would show the analyst hat, from the beginning of the conversation, S was 
not the only recipient of E's utterances, and that E's talking to S was also an 
observably competent application of instructions, designed to be observed 
and evaluated as such by Garfinkel. But note that the assumed ifference in 
outcome of the analysis depends entirely on Garfinkel's presence on the scene 
and the analyst's tape-recording of Garfinkel's exchange with E. Garfinkel 
could have said the same in his office after having heard a tape-recording of
Extract 4, but that would not have resulted in the same outcome, only be- 
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cause the analyst would not hear this exchange (Extract 4b) and, hence, could 
not have known that Garfinkel was already from the beginning implied in 
E's audience. 
Let us imagine yet another case. Let us suppose that E did not make a 
recording of the exchange with S, but only presented a report about it in 
Garfinkel's class. Or we can imagine that he did not prepare awritten report, 
but that he attended the class and was prepared to report about his experi- 
ences orally if requested. In these imagined examples, in contrast with the 
examples above, Garfinkel is not the direct recipient of E's utterances in
Extract 4. Would this mean that E's utterances were in any sense less ori- 
ented to the accomplishment of he experiment, including its reporting? To 
the contrary, these utterances are in all cases oriented to the presentation f a 
report, whether it will actually be presented to Garfinkel or not. The differ- 
ence between these examples i not the degree in which E is oriented to the 
task of achieving a reportable xperiment and hence of assembling the ele- 
ments of his report while doing the experiment, but is instead the degree to 
which this is observable for the analyst. 
it is the analyst's task to find the materials that enable her or him to make 
this orientation observable. From the examples discussed so far, it can be 
deduced that this requires that calls and conversations be studied within a 
larger context of coordinated activities. In the ethnomethodological litera- 
ture, two arguments are used for the restriction of the description of 'con- 
text' to those elements that are made available by and to members in the 
situation itself, namely, an ontological nd a methodical one. The first is that 
(occasioned) activities are not, and hence cannot be described properly as, 
enactments of plans, general designs, role expectations and the like. The 
second argument is that this restriction helps to avoid that analysts impose 
features upon the data that are not actually there for participants. These two 
arguments are, I think, no valid objections against he description of E's 
utterances as observably 'achieving a reportably sociological experiment'. 
Describing E's utterances as doing a sociological experiment does neither 
imply the assumption that E is following official or general rules of doing 
(specific) sociological experiments, nor does it mean that the analyst im- 
poses her or his reading on the data. 
My interest in describing E's utterances as oriented to 'doing an experi- 
ment' could be considered wrong throughout, because it presupposes an in- 
terest in labelling or categorising E's work. It is, however, not my proposal 
that the analysis be aimed at the labelling or categorisation f conversations 
or settings. The objective is instead to provide a description of E's work as 
viewed by himself, in accordance with the aim of ethnomethodology to ex- 
amine ordinary activities for the ways in which they e~hibit observably and 
accountably competent work practice as viewed by practitioners (Heritage, 
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1984: 302). 5 In order to accomplish this task, the methodical rules that are 
current in ethnomethodology must be revised in such a way that they enable 
the analyst o achieve more adequate, though no less rigorous, descriptions 
of the work of assembling an occasioned corpus. I will now present my pro- 
posals in more detail by discussing extracts from a psychiatric interview. 
6. Psychiatric interviewing as writing 
The following extract is a fragment of a conversation between a psychiatric 
nurse and the parents of a patient, a woman of about 20 years old who lives 
in her parents' home. The nurse pays a home call in order to interview the 
daughter in order to decide whether she should be admitted in a hospital. 
Although it is not very early in the morning, the patient is still in bed. While 
waiting for the patient, the parents and the nurse have a chat in which the 
father, from the very beginning, complains about his daughter's behavior. 
Extract 5 
F = Father; M = Mother; N = Nurse. 
1 F: I do not allow being laughed at by my children 
2 N: Have tensions between you existed for a long time? 
3 M: She is rather difficult 
4 F: Well, the problem is, she thinks that she can rule the situation here 
Although the participants in this conversation (the father, the mother and the 
nurse) know that they are talking to each other because of their respective, 
different relations to a patient, this is not a sufficient reason for assuming 
that they 'mutually understand' the conversation as a psychiatric interview. 
Even in the 'constructive' sociological approach, this assumption would re- 
quire a more elaborate argumentation with regard to questions such as: "When 
can a psychiatric interview be considered to have been begun?" and "How 
can a question about 'tensions between you' and subsequent answers be seen 
as part of a psychiatric interview?" In 'constructive' sociology, however, 
these questions can be answered by the analyst's referring to a point in the 
interview in which the nurse explicitly announces that he wants to know 
something about he patient, or by his identifying questions or answers that 
have a psychiatric meaning according to textbooks or experts. 
In an ethnomethodological approach, owever, the question is not whether 
there was at some point in the conversation an observable 'beginning' of an 
interview (though the study of such beginnings i  an ethnomethodological 
endeavor in its own right), nor how the analyst can identify the nurse's ques- 
tion as a 'psychiatric' one. For ethnomethodology theonly relevant question 
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is what the utterances of this extract accomplish as viewed by the partici- 
pants, and how that can be determined by an analyst. An answer to the latter 
question may be found by consulting Zimmerman's study of the achieve- 
ment of context in 911 emergency calls. In the examples of calls discussed 
above Zimmerman identified the achievement of a '911 emergency call con- 
text' in how receivers in callbacks eek a confirmation of their presumption 
that there is an emergency (Extracts 1 and 2 above), and in how a receiver 
refers an apparent non-emergency to another kind of service, atow company 
(Extract 3 above). In these cases, the decisive point, for the analysis, seems 
to be that the parties observably orient to a decision about the delivery of a 
service. The callbacks are heard by callers (and by the analyst, for that mat- 
ter) as receivers' attempts to determine whether further action is required. A
referral to a tow company is, similarly, heard as a decision that no further 
action on the part of the 911 emergency center will follow. 
If we apply Zimmerman's approach to Extract 5, it appears that we cannot 
find any 'context' in it. There is, in other words, no 'context' achieved. At 
least two reasons for this absence of 'context', in these four lines, can be 
identified. First, the speakers do not identify themselves in a specific rela- 
tion to the other participants, or vice versa, e.g., as a nurse vis-a-vis the rela- 
tives of a patient. The 'membership categories' used are those of father and 
children (liv._e 1), and of persons who share tensions (line 2) and a 'situation' 
(line 4). Next, the participants do not display an orientation, in these four 
lines, to a desired activity of one of them, e.g. a decision by the nurse to 
hospitalize the daughter. The conclusion is that, whereas 'constructive' soci- 
ologists (and psychologists and psychiatrists, for that matter) could easily 
identify, in this extract, parents' depicting their daughter's behavior as a prob- 
lem that, if possible, must be solved by the nurse, qua nurse, ethnometho- 
dologists will take a more careful stance and will emphasize that, although 
the parents observably present a problem to the nurse, it is not clear, in the 
extract itself, that they approach the nurse as a nurse. 
The problem can be dismissed as irrelevant. Why should we care whether, 
in this extract of only four lines that is isolated from its context anyway, a 
'psychiatric interview' is achieved or not? There are, I think, two good rea- 
sons for taking this problem seriously. Both are related to the question what 
it is that must be achieved by an ethnomethodological study of work in insti- 
tutional settings. The first reason is that it is of immediate interest for the 
nurse, while participating inthis conversation, whether the parents are com- 
plaining to him in his function as a nurse or not. It is for him of practical and 
moral importance whether the parents are, e.g., clients (who might expect a 
psychiatric service from him), informants about his patient (who acciden- 
tally is their daughter), or persons with whom he only shares company while 
waiting for the arrival of his patient. An ethnomethodological description of 
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his work must address this issue. The second reason is that the nurse is insti- 
tutionally accountable for this conversation asa part of his dealings with this 
patient. The conversation is a part of the nurse's work and, therefore, it is 
relevant to know how he manages to achieve it as a specific kind of work. 
These two reasons presuppose that, however the parents ee the nurse's role 
in the conversation (as an everyday conversationalist, as a psychiatric inter- 
viewer, as a provider of help to them, or as a combination of these), the nurse 
must decide what kind of situation it is he finds himself in. However contin- 
gent the situation might be, he must make sense of it as a nurse who is there 
to assess the case of the daughter of the persons he is talking to. 
If it is accepted that, in the flame of an ethnomethodological study, it is 
relevant to attempt to determine whether and, if so, how the nurse achieves a
psychiatric 'context' in Extract 5, the question is how we could proceed. As 
mentioned above, the extract itself gives no information that can solve this 
problem that arises precisely because the extract can be read as an example 
of an everyday conversation with the parents of a daughter. I assume that an 
ethnomethodologist would first consult he immediate nvironment of the 
extract: What did the nurse say preceding the utterance (line 1) of the father? 
How did he react o the parents' answers (lines 3 and 4) to his question (line 
2)? It is possible that in a previous utterance the nurse had expressed an 
observably professional interest in knowing more about the father's ideas 
about his children, or that he in a later utterance observably acknowledged 
receipt of the parents' answers as psychiatrically relevant. 
But what if, in a series of utterances before and after this extract, the nurse 
did not say anything that was observably oriented to a 'psychiatric context' 
(nor the parents, for that matter)? Would it be inevitable to conclude ither 
that it was a mere everyday conversation for both parties (perhaps meant as 
the mere bridging of time until the patient would arrive) or that the problem 
could not be solved with the data at hand? In my view, we do not need such 
additional evidence in order to describe the nurse's question (line 2) and his 
hearing of the parents' answers (lines 3 and 4) as an observable display (though 
not for the parents) of an orientation to competent psychiatric practice. Simi- 
larly to my contention that E's utterances in Extract 4 can be described as an 
observable display o fan orientation toGarfinkel's instructions (even although 
this cannot be observed by S, nor by the analyst if he or she confines the 
analysis to the transcript, and to observation for that matter), it is my conten- 
tion here that the nurse's question can be described as observably oriented to 
the completion of his institutional tasks (even in case this cannot be ob- 
served by the parents). 
In order to make my point, I represent inExtract 5a the same utterances a  
in Extract 5, but with the addition of fragments of two written texts. Text 1 is 
a fragment from a report written by another nurse who had talked to the 
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same patient he previous day. The nurse had read this report before paying 
his home call. Text 2 is a fragment of the report hat the nurse himself wrote 
after the home call. 
Extract 5a 
Text 1 : Parents: father says particularly recently very angry. Has a strong feeling 
about being laughed at by his daughter. 
1 F: I do not allow being laughed at by my children 
2 N: Have tensions between you existed for a long time? 
3 M: She is rather difficult 
4 F: Well, the problem is, she thinks that she can rule the situation here 
Text 2: Home visit information parents (Pat. is still asleep). Pat. is alleged 'to be 
difficult'. She wants to play the boss according to her father. 
The father's utterance (line 1) is heard by the nurse as a confirmation of the 
colleague's report of which Text 1 is a fragment, of the 'strong feeling about 
being laughed at' in particular. 6 The nurse used the occasion for an attempt to 
get confirmed the preceding information i his colleague's report (about being 
'very angry') as well. He does not receive this confirmation but does, in- 
stead, receive other information which he considers ufficiently important 
for being reported (see Text 2). The mere existence of the two texts, and their 
availability to the analyst, provide for the possibility to describe this one 
question of the nurse (line 2) as observably oriented to the rewriting of his 
colleague's report. 
In this and the previous ection I argued that utterances can legitimately 
be described as oriented to a 'context' hat is not observable to the receivers 
of those utterances. It was my aim to demonstrate that these utterances could 
be described as observably oriented to, respectively, Garfinkel's instructions 
regarding how to do a 'breaching experiment', and to reporting requirements 
in an institution for emergency psychiatry. In the next section I will show 
how this observability (for the analyst) of practitioners' orientations to an 
institutional context of reporting enables the analyst o describe not only 
how practitioners such as psychiatrists 'discover' and 'finish off' reportable 
'objects', but also how they can accomplish this in conversations with pa- 
tients who are not aware of their own contribution to the practitioners' work. 
7. Forming the potter's object 
As discussed above, Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston (1981) liken the astro- 
nomical work of discovering a pulsar to the work of a potter: 
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The analogy to the oscilloscopically displayed pulse is the developingly 
observable object of  the potter, where the pulse takes 'shape' in and as of  
the way it is worked, and from a place-to-start with to an increasingly 
definite thing (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981:137). 
The 'potter's object', however, is less appropriate as an analogy to the dis- 
covery of  a pulsar, and to its 'finishing off' as a reportable object, than to 
psychotherapeutical and psychiatric work, of  which the object-to-be-discov- 
ered is only available in talk and cannot be made visible in the form of  opti- 
cal pulses or in another material form. In the following extract from an initial 
interview in psychotherapy, for instance, it can be seen how a character trait 
o f  a client takes shape from a place-to-start with (the patient's tory about an 
encounter with his supervisor) to an increasingly definite thing (his being an 
introvert). 
Extract 6 
P = Patient; I = Interviewer. 
1 P: Well, the problem is, things come up, and that started, uhh, with my 
work, and that was really the main reason, in principle. [...] And 
the main stumbling block, 1 keep saying, that, for example, the, uhh, 
I can't say no. I am afraid that I uhh am not functioning well, at 
home, at my work, everywhere. I want to do everything well. [. . .] 
And last week I had the nerve to throw out everything to the manag- 
ing director. And apparently he was startled by it and also startled by 
the absenteeism in our department. [ ..] And I now already feel re- 
lieved from a very big burden, because I have had this interview with 
him. For there was, uhh, that, I, for let me state it this way, that was in 
my eyes the most important point. 
2 I: Yes, so really a lot of tension got off your back, because you started 
to ventilate, to disclose what is going on. 
3 P: Yes, but that's happening very often to me, when I quarrel with my 
wife, that does not happen every day, but once in a while something 
comes up, that I just blurt out. 
[data omitted] 
4 I: But does that mean, John, that somehow you are an introvert? 
5 P: Yes, one hundred percent. It keeps simmering in my stomach. 
6 I: It all stays a little bit in your mind and at a certain moment you spit 
everything at once? 
7 P: Yes, I am an introvert, yes. 
First, the interviewer formulates the gist of  the patient's utterances by para- 
phrasing "I now already feel relieved from a very big burden" as "So really 
a lot o f  tension got of f  your back". After having received the patient's confir- 
mation in utterance 3, he formulates the upshot of  the patient's talk in the 
form of  a diagnostic label ("You are an introvert") that later in the interview 
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(not presented here) and in his report functions as the ground for the inter- 
viewer's advice that the patient participate in assertiveness training sessions. 
There is, however, in this extract hardly any element that can count as ob- 
servably 'psychotherapeutical', unless all talk about he management often- 
sions in the workplace and in the family is considered 'psychotherapeutical'. 
The latter approach would, however, beg the question what in this extract 
can count as competent professional work. 
The analogy of a 'potter's object' is very appropriate in this case, because 
it acknowledges the principally open character of the interviewer's work. 
The eventual 'potter's object' can be a depression, a phobia, or whatever 
other diagnosis. It will become clear only in the course of the interview what 
the 'pot', the diagnosis, will look like. The interviewer cannot shape it ac- 
cording to a plan or design. As in the case of the astronomers' work, how- 
ever, this analogy does not sufficiently acknowledge that, in shaping the 'pot', 
the practitioner's work is restricted in specific ways. In the case of an initial 
interview in psychotherapy, for instance, only a restricted range of therapeu- 
tical advice is available, each of which can only be used in combination with 
specific diagnoses, the use of which is restricted to specific combinations of 
symptoms. Without making the mistake to describe the interviewer's work 
as the following of a design, it is necessary to identify the interviewer's 
orientation to these institutional restrictions and in particular to the require- 
ment to present he case in an observably competent way. Thus, although 
there is no explicit mentioning of a specific 'psychotherapeutical' element 
in this extract, the shaping of the patient's character as 'introvert' must be 
described as oriented to a 'corpus of knowledge' that specifies what kind of 
phenomena count as 'introvert'. The interviewer's achievement in this ex- 
tract is not only to have shaped a 'pot', in a fine-tuned cooperation with the 
patient, but also that the shaping of this object is done in a way that is ac- 
countable as competent psychotherapy. 
It is, however, not necessary that the institutional 'context' is demonstra- 
bly available to both parties in the interview. It is precisely the interviewer's 
task to achieve an observably competent interview, even in case the patient 
has no idea &what  this competence consists of. Extract 7 illustrates uch a 
situation. This extract is a fragment of the interview that the psychiatric nurse 
of Extract 5 had with the patient, after she had joined the nurse and her 
parents. 
Extract 7 
1 P: 
2 N: 
3 P: 
I've been used all my life. ((pause, then very softly:)) (what I had 
already ( ) the whole country) 
Sorry. 
The whole country knew that. 
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4 N: 
5 P: 
6 N: 
7 P: 
8 N: 
9 P: 
10 N: 
11 P: 
12 N: 
13 P: 
14 N: 
15 P: 
16 N: 
What did the whole country know? 
What I just said. 
I don't understand. I just don't get it. 
I've just been used all my life. 
By whom? 
By boys. 
Yes. And how does the whole country know about his? 
It was broadcast. 
It was broadcast. On radio or something? 
And on TV. 
That you're being used? 
No uh with whom I went o bed. 
Strange. 
In this fragment, here is no observable sign that there is a mutual under- 
standing of any other 'context' than provided by an everyday conversation 
about he woman's experiences. The explicit evaluation of the woman's tory 
as 'strange' is not 'psychiatric' in any sense, but only an everyday judgment 
that any conversationalist could (and presumably would) make. An analyst 
who would follow Zimmerman's methodical advice would, I assume, be 
obliged to conclude that the 'occasioned corpus' does not provide any spe- 
cific 'setting feature' except hose of an everyday conversation about hese 
kind of experiences. Inspection of the nurse's report, however, shows that he 
in this fragment was shaping a very specific 'pot', namely, a delusion: 
Extract 7a 
Text 2: There are clear delusional ideas. She fancies her sexual past being dis- 
closed on the radio. 
The 'pot' that is shaped in this extract, the delusion, is the product of the 
work of both parties in the interview, but only one party, the nurse, is ori- 
ented to criteria for establishing its character as a delusion. The nurse and the 
woman cooperate in the shaping of her story that hence can be considered 
their joint product. The nurse's evaluation of the woman's tory as 'strange', 
however, is not shared. Although the nurse makes his evaluation explicitly 
available to the woman, he does not make available any other orientation 
than one of an everyday kind. However, it would be a misrepresentation of 
the nurse's work if it would not be described as oriented to a set of very 
specific psychiatric criteria. While shaping, in a fine-tuned cooperation with 
the patient, the story of the broadcasting ofher sexual ife, he is at the same 
time assembling the text of a psychiatric report in which he will claim to 
have discovered 'delusional ideas'. 
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8. Conclusion 
In a critique of Goffmannian approaches, Rod Watson (1992) has called 
'ironic' the ascription to actors of motives that are not observable in actual 
behavior. In the same vein, Sharrock (1979) has, in a critique of the 'discov- 
ery' of professional dominance inmedical interviews, called it 'perverse' to 
see these interviews as sites of struggle, even where none of the participants, 
neither the patient nor the doctor, display any observable orientation to con- 
flict. These criticisms of the discoveries that are claimed by 'constructive' 
sociology are justified. In contrast, ethnomethodology andconversation a aly- 
sis have developed a program of inquiry in which only those features of a 
setting are included in the analysis that are observably displayed by partici- 
pants. This program has resulted in a series of studies which undoubtedly are 
not 'ironic' or 'perverse' in the way Watson and Sharrock apply these labels 
to other sociologists' work. It can be argued, however, that many of these 
ethnomethodological studies are equally, or perhaps more, 'ironic' or 'per- 
verse' in another way. 
Ethnomethodological and conversation analytic studies of work in insti- 
tutional settings tend to depict encounters in these settings as harmonious 
events that are characterised bymutual understanding and cooperation. This 
way of depicting these ncounters is justified in one respect, namely, in that 
these encounters arely break down. Parties usually display a mutual orien- 
tation to cooperation within a 'context' hat is made observable toeach other 
in their actions. This, however, does not imply that parties do not orient o 
other 'contexts' at the same time, without his being observable for the other 
party. Phenomena ofthis kind (such as, for instance, 'hidden agendas', 'dif- 
ferent purposes') are usually neglected in ethnomethodological andconver- 
sation analytic studies. This was, I assume, never intended. 
There is, thus, in the ethnomethodological andconversation a alytic stud- 
ies of encounters in institutional contexts a tension between, on the one hand, 
ethnomethodology's objective to examine ordinary activities for the ways in 
which they exhibit observably competent work practice as they are viewed 
by practitioners (Heritage, 1984: 302) and, on the other hand, the notion that 
the achievement of an entry into an encounter that is mutually understood to
be ' institutional' is a turn by-turn accomplishment of participants 
(Zimmerman, 1992: 37). The latter notion disregards the obvious fact that in 
most institutional encounters only one party can be considered a practitioner 
and that the practitioners' point of view will only rarely be made part of a 
mutual understanding between the participants. The notion of the 'occasioned 
corpus of setting features' in ethnomethodological and conversation ana- 
lytic studies of work must be extended in such a way that it is allowed, or 
even acknowledged asgood practice, to admit elements to which only one 
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party's orientation isobservable for the analyst, even if that orientation can- 
not be observed by other parties in the event. 
It must, of course, be avoided that an extended version of the notion of the 
'occasioned corpus' would reintroduce practices of'constructive' sociology 
in the analysis. It is necessary, therefore, that criteria be developed for the 
inclusion of elements in the 'occasioned corpus'. In the examples discussed 
in this paper, all elements that were admitted to the 'corpus' were available 
in the form of texts that were consulted or written (by the practitioner whose 
work was studied) in the course of the work of which the analyzed extracts 
were a part. These texts were taken as evidence that the practitioners ori- 
ented their utterances not only to the one recipient they were talking to, but 
at the same time also to colleagues and supervisors not present, and that 
these utterances would have been recognised by these colleagues as oriented 
to them if they would have been present. Only those elements are admitted 
to the 'extended corpus' which can be considered as observably oriented to 
local practices of reporting and which hence can be seen as oriented to re- 
porting to specific olleagues on specific occasions. The difference between 
this approach and 'constructive' analysis is precisely the difference between 
this restriction to local practices, in which the studied encounters are embed- 
ded, on the one hand, and 'constructive' orientations tomore abstract formal 
rules for professional conduct on the other hand. 
Summarizing, ethnomethodology can achieve more adequate and more 
relevant descriptions of institutional encounters, if these encounters are not 
only considered as conversations of which a mutual understanding of its 
character isaccomplished ona turn-by-turn basis by participants (Zimmerman, 
1992: 37), but also, and at the same time, as work of which each element 
must be reportable to colleagues and supervisors inthe local setting in which 
the work is done. It is proposed that actual reports composed by the practi- 
tioners whose work is studied, in either written or spoken form, be admitted 
to the 'corpus'. When these reports are admitted to the 'corpus', they will 
make observable how practitioners' turns in the conversation are oriented to 
the shaping of specific reportable objects. 
Notes 
1. Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston use the term 'Run' where the astronomers themselves 
use 'Observation'. It speaks of a course of work, with an announced beginning and end, 
during which determinations are made and from which observations are extracted. Suc- 
cessive Observations are enumerated which, e.g., enables the astronomers tolocate their 
discovery of a pulsar in the Observations 18 through 23. (Cf. Garfinkel, Lynch and 
Livingston, 1981: 134, n.13.) 
2. Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston (1981: 138) claim that, in the published article, the 
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pulsar "is depicted as the cause of everything that is seen and said about it". This is 
misleading in so far as the self-reflexive nature of astronomical reporting provides for an 
acknowledgement of the astronomical work of observing and interpreting that is a neces- 
sary condition for 'seeing' the pulsar and 'saying' things about it. (I owe this point to 
Dorothy Smith.) 
3. In this presentation I will use the term 'context' as consistently as possible for 'institu- 
tional context' in the sense as used solar. Zimmerman complicates matters abit by using 
the term 'context' for 'sequential context' as well. 
4. In this section the focus was on the article "Achieving context" because Zimmerman 
presents it as a programmatic discussion of the conversation analytic viewpoint, as op- 
posed to "the grain of the received view of social structure" (Zimmerman, 1992: 35), and 
because it is remarkably consistent with Zimmerman and Pollner's discussion of the 'oc- 
casioned corpus'. Zimmerman shows interest in a more extended corpus, however, in 
more recent work, in particular in the paper he presented at the conference 
"Ethnomethodology: Twenty Five Years Later", 13--16 August, 1992, Waltham, MA. At 
the same conference, a similar extension of the occasioned corpus as proposed in the 
present paper was advocated by Dorothy Smith, Jack Whalen and Marilyn Whalen in 
another paper on 911 emergency calls. 
5. This is perhaps an unfortunate expression because it sounds rather close to a focus on 
'perspective' or perception, whereas ethnomethodology clearly is not a form of 'sociol- 
ogy of perspectives'. Something like 'for practitioners' would be better, since the empha- 
sis is on members' ensemaking practices. (I owe this point to Peter Grahame.) 
Heap (1980: 87) argues that ethnomethodology's task should not be conceived as the 
description of actual properties of courses of action and reasoning but instead of possible 
properties. Thus, according to Heap, Heritage should have written 'viewable' rather than 
'viewed'. It is the aim of the present paper, however, to discuss ome self-imposed me- 
thodical restrictions that are a hindrance to ethnomethodology's achieving proper de- 
scriptions of actual properties. 
6. The nurse did not consult his colleague's report during the interview with the parents. 
Apparently the nurse had a vivid recollection of the text. 
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